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Abstract
We study the effects of sterilised intervention operations executed on behalf of
the Swiss National Bank (SNB) using tick-by-tick transactions data between
1986 and 1995. We extend the preliminary analysis of Fischer and Zurlinden
(1999) by matching these data with indicative intra-day exchange rate quotes
and news-wire reports of central bank activity. Using an event study approach
we find that intervention has important short-run effects on exchange rate re-
turns. In particular, among various results, we find that i) intervention has a
stronger impact when the SNB moves with-the-market and when its activity is
concerted with that of other central banks and ii) exchange rate returns move
in the 15 minute interval prior to interventions.
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1 Introduction
Scholars have long debated whether central bank intervention operations in the markets for
foreign exchange have important effects on exchange rate levels and volatility and on mar-
ket conditions. While it can be theoretically established that sterilised intervention affects
the value of currencies and level of activity in FX markets, either through a portfolio-
balance effect or via a signalling channel (Mussa (1981), Bhattacharya and Weller (1997),
and Vitale (1999,2002)), the effectiveness of sterilised intervention remains an unresolved
issue from an empirical point of view.
A contributory factor to the unresolved nature of this issue has been a lack of adequate
data on central bank intervention transactions. Indeed, until recently, researchers only had
access to data sets in which intervention operations were aggregated to daily or lower fre-
quencies.1 This has proved a serious impediment to empirical analysis of the effects of
intervention on exchange rates as, with coarsely sampled data, it is difficult/impossible to
overcome simultaneity problems and to characterise the high-frequency effects of inter-
vention on market conditions.
However, recently the Swiss National Bank (SNB) has made an innovative data set avail-
able to researchers, containing tick-by-tick observations on its intervention operations in
FX markets between 1986 and 1995. We extend a preliminary analysis of this data set by
Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), by combining the information it contains with indicative ex-
change rate quotes recorded by Olsen and Associates and with Reuters news-wire reports
of central banks’ activity.
These data allow us to conduct a high-frequency analysis of the effects of signed in-
tervention operations on exchange returns. We construct time-series for the USD/CHF
exchange rate and signed intervention quantities sampled once every 15 minutes and use
these data to analyse the effects of intervention via an event study.2
The particular focus of our study is the empirical relevance of the signalling hypothe-
sis. This hypothesis suggests that intervention operations are used by monetary authorities
to convey information to FX markets and hence alter market expectations and exchange
rates. Thus, if central bank operations are informative signed intervention should have a
significant and permanent effect on the value of currencies.
1See Dominguez and Frankel (1993b), Dominguez and Frankel (1993a). Edison (1993) and Sarno and
Taylor (2000) contain extensive reviews of this literature.
2Several recent studies also focus on the intra-day effects of intervention on exchange rates (Peiers 1997,
Dominguez 1999, Evans and Lyons 2000) although none of these use actual intra-day intervention data.
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Other important issues we can analyse using the event study methodology include: i) the
speed with which intervention influences markets, ii) the impact of intervention size and
iii) the effects of market conditions on the effectiveness of intervention. With respect to the
first issue, it is usually presumed that FX markets are very resilient and process information
very quickly. The current analysis gives us an opportunity to test this assertion. Analysis of
the impact of intervention size is also important, in that the signalling hypothesis suggests
that intervention is effective because it is potentially expensive. Hence larger trades should
have a bigger impact on exchange rates and market characteristics. Finally, we investigate
whether interventions that seek to reinforce prior exchange rate movements have different
effects than those which seek to reverse such movements.
The main findings from our analysis are the following.
1. Intervention events have a positive effect on exchange rates: when the SNB pur-
chases (sells) US dollars, the American currency appreciates (depreciates). The im-
pact of intervention is immediate, as the exchange rate moves within the 15 minute
interval during which an intervention event is reported, and persistent, as the cumula-
tive effect is still significant after few hours. We also observe market anticipation of
intervention information, as the exchange rate moves (significantly) in the direction
of the operation in the 15 minute interval that precedes that in which the event oc-
curs. Likewise, we detect partial reversal of the intervention effect in the 15 minute
period immediately after the event interval.
2. These conclusions hold: i) when we simply consider the direction of intervention
as an explanatory variable, ii) when we employ the signed intervention size in the
regression analysis of the exchange rate return and iii) even when we account for
the effects of the intervention activity of other central banks, notably the Fed and the
Buba. On the contrary these conclusions are not valid when we use non-intervention
trades carried out by the SNB instead of intervention operations.
3. The impact of SNB activity is larger and more persistent: i) when operations are con-
certed with those of the Buba and the Fed than when they are conducted unilaterally
and ii) when intervention follows the current trend rather than opposing it.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe our data
set and the statistical properties of the exchange rate and intervention series. In Section 3
we present our results. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Data
As noted in the introduction, the main innovation of the current study is the use of a
transactions-level data set on central bank spot purchases and sales of US dollars, time
stamped to the minute. These transactions were conducted by the SNB in the USD/CHF
market and are recorded for the period covering 1986 to 1995.
The deals that comprise our data are of two types: interventions and customer transac-
tions. The aim of SNB interventions is to influence the value of the Swiss franc exchange
rate,3 while customer transactions are triggered by the need of the Swiss government for
foreign currency. In the period these data cover the SNB dealing desk would first negotiate
a buy or sell order with a FX dealer. After completion, it would notify the counterparty if
the transaction was part of an intervention operation or not. Given the different nature of
the two types of transactions, our work will focus mainly on the interventions although we
provide some analysis of customer trades for comparison.
The second component of our data set consists of tick-by-tick indicative exchange rate
quotes on the USD/CHF. These exchange rate data cover the period from March 1986
to November 1999. Simultaneous examination of the exchange rate data and the SNB
transactions will allow us to provide very accurate, high-frequency characterisations of the
manner in which intervention operations affect FX rates.
The final segment of the data we employ is a set of Reuters news-wire reports of central
bank activity in FX markets. We have, for the period from August 1989 to the end of
1995, Reuters news headline data, timestamped to the second, for every day upon which
the Federal Reserve intervened in FX markets. As such, we can retrieve all reports of Fed
intervention activity for this period and a significant number of intervention reports for
the Buba and the SNB given the correlation between the timings of Fed interventions and
interventions by the other two banks. Clearly, though, we do not have news headline data
for those interventions undertaken by the SNB and the Buba on days upon which the Fed
did not intervene. Also, it should be noted that the sample period for our news headline
data is shorter than that for the transaction-level SNB data.
Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) propose a prior analysis of the transactions data, providing
3Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) discuss the objectives behind SNB interventions. They indicate that “The
SNB intervened to affect the trend of the exchange rate or counteract market disturbances. Solidarity with
other central banksmay also have been an importantmotive (...)”. However, they also note that “This does not
imply that the SNB always followed the lead of key central banks. The Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank
intervened more frequently than the SNB during the sample period.”
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an analysis of the signalling hypothesis that uses only the actual SNB intervention data.
Hence, the only price data used in their study are the actual transactions prices at which
SNB interventions were completed. This necessitates the use of an empirical model which
accounts for the fact that interventions (and hence price observations) are irregularly spaced
in time. Their results imply that, given that the SNB was in the market on a given day,
purchases of dollars lead to dollar appreciations and sales lead to dollar depreciation. This
effect is only significant for the first intervention on a given day.
Panel (a) of Table 1 gives basic statistical information on the frequency, size and di-
rection of individual intervention transactions and SNB customer trades. The table shows
that there were almost twice as many interventions to sell dollars than interventions to buy.
Hence, the mean intervention quantity is significantly negative and median intervention
size is -$5m. Also, intervention quantity has negative skew and is leptokurtic. Positive
and negative interventions (taken separately) both have median size of $10m. and, further,
negative interventions (i.e. dollar sales) are more dispersed in magnitude. The statistics
for customer transactions demonstrate that they tend to be larger and more dispersed in
size than interventions.4 Moreover, while interventions are predominantly dollar sales,
customer transactions are largely purchases of dollars.
Summary statistics for the data series derived from the indicative exchange rate quotes
are given in panel (b) of Table 1. As the statistical properties of these indicative quote data
are well known (see, for example, Andersen and Bollerslev (1997)) we only give a brief
analysis of the data here. The statistics in the Table are based on a 15 minute calendar time
sampling of the data. We use this sampling frequency in the majority of our analysis and
it was chosen so as to allow us to characterise the fine detail of the high-frequency data
without uncovering the statistical distortions that emerge when indicative data are sampled
too frequently (see Danielsson and Payne (2000)).5
Examining the first row of panel (b) of Table 1 we see the standard statistical features
of intra-day exchange rate returns i.e. zero mean, little skew and strong leptokurtosis, plus
negative autocorrelation in returns at displacement 1. This means that when studying the
effects of interventions on returns we should take account of the low displacement return
4While on the basis of daily data it seems that for the Buba and Fed the size of interventions is larger,
the difference might just be apparent, given that SNB intervention operations are generally split in a number
trades.
5We have also studied the relationship between the prices at which interventions actually take place and
the indicative quote data, comparing the intervention price with the final midquote from the intervention
interval. The mean discrepancy between these two numbers is not significantly different from zero and is
about 0.02 percent of the midquote. There is some tendency for the (absolute) pricing discrepancy to increase
with the size of the intervention as one might expect.
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autocorrelation and employ Newey-West standard errors.
3 High-Frequency Effects of Sterilised Intervention
3.1 A simple test of the signalling hypothesis
An empirical analysis of the relationship between exchange rate changes and the inter-
ventions of central banks would ideally be founded on a structural model. Using such a
model, in which exchange rate returns and intervention operations were determined simul-
taneously, one could deal with identification issues and isolate the exchange rate effects of
unexpected components of intervention. However, no straightforward and empirically im-
plementable model exists. Thus, we base our empirical analysis of effects of intervention
on the USD/CHF on a standard event study.
In Table 2 and Figure 1 we present results from a linear regression of the 15 minute
percentage return on the USD/CHF on leads and lags of a signed intervention indicator,
It (i.e. It is +1 in any interval where the SNB purchased dollars, -1 in intervals when the
SNB sold dollars and zero otherwise. There was no 15 minute interval where the SNB both
bought and sold dollars.) This specification, displayed below, is estimated using the entire
sample of 343680 return observations, covering nine years of intervention activity on the
part of the SNB between 1986 and 1995;
rt  α
8∑
j8
β jIt j γ1rt1 γ2rt2 εt  (1)
We consider 8 leads and lags of the intervention variable so as to capture the effects of
intervention in the 2 hours before and after any intervention event. Two lags of the depen-
dent variable are included to pick up the low displacement return autocorrelation identified
in Section 2. We have considered specifications with a larger number of leads and lags,
obtaining qualitatively similar results.
The results from estimation of equation (1) are given in the second column of Table 2.
We see that only the contemporaneous intervention indicator, It , one lead, It1, and one lag,
It1, have significant coefficients. Since the coefficient on It1 is positive and significant,
Table 2 implies that an intervention impacts the return in the 15 minute interval before it
actually occurs, possibly because market participants are able to anticipate central bank
intervention. The total impact of an intervention operation is not completely anticipated
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though, as the coefficient on It is large, positive and significant. Furthermore, the sig-
nificant, negative coefficient on It1 implies that the impact on the USD/CHF is partially
reversed in the 15 minute interval that follows an intervention event. This indicates that
market participants over-react in response to the information contained in interventions.
The total effect of an intervention operation is best displayed through a graphical repre-
sentation of the results reported in Table 2. In the left panel of Figure 1 we plot the effect of
a dollar purchase by the SNB on the USD/CHF exchange rate (as estimated by partial sums
of the coefficients on leads and lags of It in the second column of Table 2). The dashed
lines trace out a 2 standard deviation confidence interval for the total exchange rate impact.
The plot of the cumulative intervention effect confirms the conclusions drawn from Table
2, as we observe a large impact, of around 20 basis points, from a purchase of US dollars.
Despite the clear mean-reverting behaviour of the cumulative exchange rate impact, after
two hours the impact is still positive, roughly equal to 10 basis points.
Hence, interventions appear to have significant and persitent effects on exchange rate
levels.67 Notice that, since during the sample period the SNB sterilised all of its inter-
vention transactions, we cannot attribute this effect to changes in monetary aggregates.8
Instead, these results suggest that SNB intervention activity “carries” information.
3.2 The impact of customer trades on exchange rates
A refined way to test the signalling hypothesis compares the effects of SNB interventions
on the USD/CHF with those of customer trades. If the impact on exchange rates of inter-
vention operations was of comparable magnitude to that of non-intervention order flows,
one might argue that there is nothing “special” about interventions and the results reported
in subsection 3.1 could be due to a liquidity effect rather than an information-based one
6We obtain qualitatively similar results from estimations of equation (1) using lower frequencies (i.e
hourly, 2 hourly, 4 hourly, 12 hourly, and daily) exchange rate return and intervention data. Results are
available upon request.
7We have checked the temporal stability of our regression results via a simply dummy variable analysis
that splits the intervention data into two equally sized subsamples. The first subsample roughly contains
all interventions during the years 1986 through 1990 and the second subsample 1991 through 1995. The
results from the two subsamples were qualitatively very similar but, interestingly, the size of the intervention
coefficients was much larger in the second subsample. Thus SNB interventions had greater exchange rate
effects in the 1990s.
8The effects on monetary aggregates of any purchase or sale of US dollars would be sterilisised within
the same day through a compensatory open market operation. While there could be a time lag between
the two operations, this discrepancy should not bear any effect on the USD/CHF exchange rate, as market
participants would anticipate that any temporary change in liquidity would be negligible.
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(Evans and Lyons 2000). Thus we compare the effects of those transactions carried out
by the SNB on behalf of the Swiss government with those of interventions. As the former
are the consequence of the liquidity needs of the Swiss government, these operations are
analogous to any transaction of US dollars in the USD/CHF market by private operators.
To test whether intervention operations have a stronger exchange rate impact than other
trading activity, we construct the variableCTt which is a signed SNB customer trading ac-
tivity indicator: CTt takes a value of +1 (-1) for those intervals in which the SNB purchases
(sells) US dollars as a consequence of the Swiss government’s needs. In the last column
of Table 2 we report results from estimation of equation (2), which is entirely analogous to
the specification we used to asses the effects of interventions:
rt  α 
8∑
j8
β jCTt j 
2∑
j1
γ j rt j  εt  (2)
Similar to the results of Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), we find that the coefficients of the
leads and lags of SNB customer trades often have the wrong sign and are, in general, not
significantly different from zero. More tellingly, in the right panel of Figure 1 we present
the cumulative exchange rate impact of a customer purchase of dollars. In stark contrast
to the left panel of Figure 1, there is no clear pattern in this picture and at no point is the
cumulative effect significantly different from zero.
Since their effects are neither significant nor persistent, we conclude that SNB customer
trades are qualitatively different to SNB intervention activity. The latter has a significant
and persistent effect on the USD/CHF in the expected direction while the former do not
even temporarily affect prices. This confirms that interventions carry information.
3.3 The impact of the intervention size on exchange rates
To further investigate the signalling hypothesis, in Table 3 we report the results from es-
timation of two new specifications for the USD/CHF return. In the first we regress rt on
leads and lags of the signed intervention indicator, It , alongside those of the signed inter-
vention quantity, Xt . In the second, we substitute the leads and lags of the signed indicator
with corresponding leads and lags of signed, squared quantity:
rt  α 
8∑
j8
β j It j 
8∑
j8
δ j Xt j 
2∑
j1
γ j rt j  εt  (3)
8
rt  α 
8∑
j8
δ j Xt j 
8∑
j8
θ j signXt jX2t j 
2∑
j1
γ j rt j  εt  (4)
Equation (3) allows to assess the relevance of the size of intervention. Equation (4) indi-
cates if the relationship between intervention size and the USD/CHF return is non-linear.
Table 3 shows the estimation results for equations (3) and (4). Results for the first
regression indicate that the introduction of the signed quantity variables does not alter
the sign or significance of the coefficients on leads and lags of the indicator. However, the
size of the intervention operation is important as the coefficient on current intervention, δ0,
is significantly positive, suggesting that the larger the magnitude of intervention, the larger
its immediate impact on the exchange rate. The relationship between intervention size and
the exchange rate is shown in the left panel of Figure 2, where we present the cumulative
effect of dollar purchases of different sizes. We see that a purchase of $50 million by the
SNB has a large immediate impact, of nearly 30 basis points, on the exchange rate.
This impact is an order of magnitude larger than the lower bound estimated by Evans
and Lyons (2000) for the impact of central bank intervention in the USD/DEM market (5
basis points for operations of $100 million). The difference may be generated by either the
different sizes of the two markets or the absence of actual interventions in their data set,
which precludes the direct evaluation of the information content of intervention operations.
Results for the second regression indicate that the relation between the exchange rate
and intervention size is not linear: the coefficient on the contemporaneous value of signed,
squared size is significantly negative. To judge the importance of the concavity, consider
the right panel of Figure 2, where we present the contemporaneous impact, implied by the
estimates of equation (4), of US dollar purchases of different sizes: the graphical represen-
tation clearly suggests that the non-linearity is not economically significant.
In summary, for this Section, our results seem to confirm the signalling hypothesis.
Intervention operations in FX markets represent an expensive instrument of policymaking.
Then, because of their potential cost, they can be employed by monetary authorities to
credibly convey information to market participants and hence condition market sentiment
and currency values. Moreover, since large operations are potentially more expensive they
have a bigger impact on exchange rate returns than small ones.9
9For a formal discussion see Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) and Vitale (1999,2002).
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3.4 Intervention and market momentum
Dominguez and Frankel (1993b) list several reasons that might induce monetary authorities
to intervene in FX markets, among which prevails the desire to calm disorderly markets.
In practice, this often means that central banks purchase or sell currency in order to reverse
a recent change in price. This motivates an analysis of whether interventions that are with
the wind have significantly different effects on rates than those that lean against the wind.
To test for differences, we use two different definitions of intervention with/against-the-
trend. We denote an intervention operation as with-the-trend if its sign is the same as that
of the change in the exchange rate over the previous 6 or 24 hours.1011 Against-the-trend
observations are defined in the corresponding fashion. We then run separate regressions
of USD/CHF returns on leads and lags of with/against-the-trend interventions, identical
in structure to equation (1). We experimented with the use of current signed intervention
quantities and signed, squared quantities in the specification (as Table 3 implies we should)
but in no case was either significant.
The results from these regressions are reported in Table 4. In Figure 3 we present plots
of the cumulative intervention effects for the two regressions that use the daily definition
of trend. Table 4 and Figure 3 indicate two important conclusions.
First, the impact of a purchase of US dollars by the SNB is much more pronounced,
persistent and significant when intervention is with-the-trend, especially for the regression
based on the 6 hour trend definition. In Figure 3, the immediate increase in the USD/CHF
due to a with-the-wind intervention is of the order of 35 basis points and after two hours the
total impact is still significant and around 25 basis points. On the contrary, for against-the
trend interventions we observe a much smaller impact at the time of the intervention and
the cumulative abnormal return drops to zero within a couple of hours.
The second interesting result from these regressions is that the “ anticipation effect”
identified in Section 3.1 is still present for the the with-the-wind regressions but is entirely
absent for the against-the-wind regressions.
This finding is suggestive of an SNB policy of intervening with the wind on a very high-
frequency basis. Note in fact from Table 4 that, using the trend definition based on the 6
10Given the particular focus of our analysis, we employ an high-frequency notion of “trend” that differs
from common practice. However, qualitatively similar conclusions are derived using more common defini-
tions of “trend”, based on weekly or monthly returns.
11Note that these “trend” periods are measured so as to end two hours before any intervention such that it
does not overlap with any of the leads of It in the regression specification.
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hour return, there are almost twice as many with-trend interventions than against-trend in-
terventions and for the with-trend regressions, the coefficients on the leads of intervention
tend to be positive. Based on this, we conjecture that one factor underlying our “antici-
pation effect” is that not only does the SNB choose to intervene after a few hours during
which the change in the rate has been in the desired direction, but it also tends to time
interventions such that they are immediately after price moves in the right direction.
3.5 Coordination, anticipation and news-wire reports
In the previous subsection we conjectured that the SNB chose to intervene after short-run
price moves in the direction it wished to push the rate, so that the effect of its activity on
the USD/CHF return is felt in the 15 minutes before interventions occur. An alternative
explanation for the “anticipation effect” is the presence of small reporting lags in the in-
tervention data set. In the mid 1980s and the early 1990s intervention operations were
completed on the phone and subsequently registered on report slips.
We investigate the possibility that this process led to reported intervention times being
slightly later than actual intervention times by examining the effects of interventions oc-
curring in the first 5 minutes of any 15 minute interval separately from all others. If there
was a reporting lag we would expect to see such interventions strongly affecting returns
in the interval prior to that in which the intervention was reported whilst the remaining
intervention observations would not. This is not the case in the data.
A third explanation for the “anticipation effect” is related to the way SNB intervention
operations are co-ordinated with those of other central banks. As noted by Fischer and
Zurlinden (1999), practically all SNB intervention operations occurring within our sample
period were “coordinated” with either the Fed or the Buba, meaning that they would take
place on those days in which at least one of these two central banks was also present in
the market. Thus, one might argue that coordinated intervention activity explains why i)
interventions have greater exchange rate effects when they are with-the-trend and ii) ex-
change rates move in the direction of SNB intervention 15 minutes before the intervention
actually takes place. If the activity of the SNB follows the lead of the Fed and Buba (and
their intervention is effective) then we will see SNB interventions with large effects which
appear to be with-the-trend and anticipated by movements in the USD/CHF return.
To check this hypothesis we attempt to differentiate the effects of coordinated and non-
coordinated intervention. For such an exercise, we would ideally require full transactions
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data on Fed and Buba interventions for our sample period. Since these data are not avail-
able we use, as a second best solution, the news-wire reports of Fed and Buba interventions
discussed in Section 2. Note that, given the partial overlap between the headline and in-
tervention data, this means we must work with a smaller data sample for this analysis,
covering the period from August 1989 and December 1995.12
Using the news headline data we employ a narrow notion of coordination intervention:
an SNB intervention is said to be closely-timed or concerted if the Fed and Buba were
both reported to be intervening in the market up to 1 hour before the SNB action or 45
minutes afterwards.13 All other SNB interventions are classed as non-concerted. Using
this split of the SNB interventions we can estimate extended versions of equation (1) that
separate the effects of concerted/non-concerted activity. Specifically, defining Ct to be a
concerted intervention indicator taking the value +1 in intervals during which a concerted
intervention occurred and zero otherwise, we estimate
rt  α 
8∑
j8
β j It j 
1∑
j1
κ jCt jIt j 
2∑
j1
γ j rt j  εt  (5)
rt  α 
8∑
j8
β j It j 
1∑
j1
κ jCt jIt j  δ0Xt λ0CtXt 
2∑
j1
γ j rt j  εt  (6)
where It is a signed SNB intervention indicator and Xt is signed SNB intervention size
as before. Note that in equation (6) we also allow current intervention quantity to affect
returns, both in isolation and in interaction with the concerted intervention dummy.
In Table 5 we report the estimated coefficients for equations (5) and (6). We notice two
interesting results: i) the effect of SNB intervention activity is more pronounced when it is
concerted with that of the Buba and the Fed; ii) the “anticipation effect” does not disappear.
In particular, the coefficients of the first lead and the contemporaneous value of the
product of the concerted intervention indicator, Ct , with the signed intervention indicator,
It , and the signed intervention quantity, Xt , are positive. Moreover, even though none
12As a check of the quality of such data we cross the information contained in the news-wire reports
with that for the SNB intervention. We find that 74% of all SNB intervention operations were reported
by Reuters. Moreover, of those intervention operations which were concerted with the Buba and the Fed
84% were reported. Finally, of the intervention operations which were reported, the median of the time lag
between the actual operation and the corresponding report is 11 minutes and 30 seconds for all operations
and 11 minutes for the concerted ones.
13Of the 62 interventions in the August 1989 to December 1995 sub-sample, 22 are classified as concerted.
We have experimentedwith alternative definitions for concerted intervention, for example defining concerted
interventions as those when the SNB, Buba and Fed were all in the market on the same day. The results
derived are qualitatively similar to those presented here.
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of these coefficients is significant at the 5% level, several are close to significance at the
10% level. This confirms common wisdom that intervention is more effective when it
is coordinated, as then market participants observe a clear consensus among monetary
authorities over the desired direction of movement for the exchange rate.
It should also be noted that the first lead of the SNB intervention indicator retains sig-
nificance at the 1% level in equation (5) and at the 10% level in equation (6), suggesting
that it is not simply coordinated intervention activity that explains the movement of the
exchange rate return in intervals immediately before an SNB intervention operation.
To further investigate the effects of co-ordinated intervention, we proceed to directly and
separately evaluate the effects of Fed and Buba activity on the USD/CHF using the news-
wire data. Rather than combining them with the SNB interventions to create a concerted
intervention dummy we now create separate signed intervention indicators for the Fed and
Buba from the news headlines.14 We then estimate the following specification;
rt  α 
8∑
j8
β j It j 
4∑
j4
φ j IFt j 
4∑
j4
ψ j IBt j 
2∑
j1
γ j rt j  εt  (7)
where IFt is the signed Fed intervention indicator and I
B
t is the signed Buba intervention
indicator. We do not use SNB intervention quantities anywhere in equation (7) as we do
not have quantity data for the other interventions of the other two banks. In Table 6 we
present the estimated coefficients from this specification.
The coefficients confirm that reports of Fed and Buba intervention activity have a sig-
nificant effect on the USD/CHF return. As expected, purchases (sales) of the American
currency on the part of the Fed or the Buba tend to appreciate (depreciate) the US dollar.
Consistent with prior results in Dominguez (1999), we also see that the effect of these
intervention reports is felt well before the reporting interval: the third lead of Fed interven-
tion, IFt3, and the second and third leads of Buba intervention, I
B
t2 and I
B
t3, are positive
and significantly so at the 1% level. Hence, exchange rates react up to 45 minutes ahead of
Reuters intervention reports, due to the delay in these reports’ publication.
More importantly, in Table 6 we see that the coefficients on the first lead of the SNB
intervention indicator and its contemporaneous value are still positive and significant at
the 1% level. Once more, this indicates that even when accounting for the reports of other
central bank activity i) purchases and sales of US dollars on the part of the SNB have an
14The indicators can be signed as the news headlines always include an indication of the direction of the
intervention.
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important impact on USD/CHF returns and ii) the impact of these SNB operations is in
part felt before their completion.
Thus these results confirm the importance of SNB activity, even after accounting for Fed
and Buba operations, but the “anticipation” puzzle remains. We cannot, however, rule out
the possibility that the shortcomings in our data on Fed and Buba interventions – we don’t
have actual transactions information but only a set of news-wire reports for days on which
the Fed intervened and only for a subperiod of our entire sample – are behind our inability
to explain the “anticipation effect” via co-ordination. If we had full transaction information
on Fed and Buba operations we could test for coordination effects far more cleanly.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have conducted an investigation of the effects of sterilised intervention in the spot
USD/CHF market. The novelty of this study lies in the use of a transaction based data set
of SNB activity between 1986 and 1995, the information from which we combine with
indicative exchange rate quotes recorded by Olsen and Associates and Reuters news-wire
reports. With such a rich data set we have been able to identify a clear and significant link
between FX intervention and exchange rate returns. In particular, using an event study, we
have exactly quantified the effects of single intervention operations on the USD/CHF rate
at a 15 minute sampling frequency.
Our analysis suggests four important results: i) SNB intervention operations have strong
and persistent effects on the USD/CHF which remain after accounting for the operations
of other central banks; ii) SNB interventions are more effective in conditioning exchange
rates when they are coordinated with other central banks; iii) interventions which are with-
the-trend have stronger exchange rate impacts; iv) the exchange rate moves in the direction
of the intervention in the minutes before the actual intervention takes place.
Clearly, the latter result is puzzling as it may indicate that some market participants
learn about upcoming SNB interventions shortly before they actually occur. We find that
the result persists even after accounting for the effects of co-ordinated intervention among
central banks using news-wire reports of Fed and Buba activity. Our interpretation of this
result is that the SNB chose to intervene with-the-wind on a very high-frequency basis
i.e. it is not that intervention affects returns one-period ahead of its reported time (due,
for example, to leakage of intervention information) but that intervention is timed by the
SNB to follow high-frequency price moves in the direction that the SNB desires to push
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the exchange rate. Perhaps this is due to the SNB recognising that interventions that follow
a recent trend are more likely to be successful than those opposing recent trends.
A clearer picture of the anticipated intervention effect could be given via a structural
analysis of the effects of intervention on exchange rates, as this would solve identification
problems and isolate the effects of the unexpected components of intervention. However,
such an analysis is very hard to implement, in that it is quite difficult to predict intervention
operations. This difficulty is particularly acute for the initial operations within single in-
tervention episodes. This is unfortunate, because exactly these operations appear (Fischer
and Zurlinden 1999) to be responsible for most of the effects on exchange rates of FX
intervention. We leave this avenue to future research.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for intervention transactions, customer trades and indicative
USD/CHF data
Panel (a)
Variable Obs. Mean s.d. Median Skew Kurt
It 709 -3.29 10.41 -5 -1.40 11.54
Ct 455 15.46 27.06 10 2.48 14.06
Variable Obs. Mean s.d. Median Min Max
It 243 8.39
 3.23 10 5 35
It 466 -9.39
 7.14 -10 -100 -5
Ct 415 19.01
 24.70 10 0.7 200
Ct 40 -21.33
 22.93 -11.59 -91.85 -5.68
Panel (b)
Variable Mean s.d. Skew Kurtosis ρˆ1 Q10
rt -2.8 105 0.086 0.054 28.472 -0.112 4383.875
qt 27.333 742.561 1.477 5.491 0.893 1734989.700
rt  0.052 0.068 4.544 53.490 0.292 98366.779
Notes: Intervention and customer trades statistics are calculated from the tick-by-tick transaction series.
Statistics on indicative USD/CHF data are based on 343680 observations with a 15 minute sampling fre-
quency. This sample omits exchange rate data from weekends. I t is signed intervention quantity (positive
for dollar purchases.) It and I

t are the subsamples of interventions with positive and negative sizes respec-
tively. Ct is signed customer trade quantity (positive for dollar purchases.) Ct and C

t are the subsamples
of customer trades with positive and negative sizes respectively. rt is the percentage return on the USD/CHF
and qt is the count of the number of quote entries in a given 15 minute period. The final variable r t  is the
absolute exchange rate return. A  indicates that the given statistic is significantly different from zero at the
5% level. sd is the standard deviation of the given variable, Skew is the coefficient of skewness and Kurt is
excess kurtosis.
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Table 2: Effects of signed SNB trading activity on percentage return
Equation (1) Equation (2)
Regressor Coefficient Regressor Coefficient
α 0.0000 α 0.0000
β8 -0.0120 β8 -0.0047
β7 0.0117 β7 -0.0008
β6 0.0077 β6 -0.0117
β5 -0.0207 β5 -0.0018
β4 -0.0023 β4 -0.0056
β3 0.0261 β3 -0.0072
β2 0.0080 β2 -0.0036
β1 0.0467 β1 -0.0229
β0 0.1241 β0 -0.0095
β
1 -0.0338 β1 0.0048
β
2 -0.0069 β2 0.0006
β
3 -0.0174 β3 0.0029
β
4 -0.0162 β4 0.0061
β
5 0.0120 β5 -0.0058
β
6 -0.0032 β6 0.0009
β
7 -0.0069 β7 -0.0041
β
8 -0.0103 β8 0.0072
γ1 01146 γ1 01142
γ2 00167 γ2 00175
R¯2 0.014 R¯2 0.013
Q5 3032 Q5 3.97
Notes: Regression coefficients are estimated using the OLS method with Newey-West standard errors and
2 lags in the dependent variable. It is signed SNB intervention while CTt is signed SNB customer trading
activity (+1 for dollar purchases, -1 for dollar sales). r t is the percentage return on the USD/CHF. A  ()
indicates that the given statistic is significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level. Q5 is the fifth
order Box-Ljung statistic for serial correlation.
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Table 3: Effects of intervention size on returns
Equation (3) Equation (4)
Regression Coefficient Regression Coefficient
α -0.00002 α -0.00002
β4 -0.00906 δ4 0.00004
β3 0.03121 δ3 0.0009
β2 0.00549 δ2 0.00062
β1 0.04614 δ1 0.00164
β0 0.06687 δ0 0.00371
β
1 -0.03858 δ1 -0.00106
β
2 -0.01035 δ2 -0.00018
β
3 -0.01056 δ3 -0.00071
β
4 -0.02174 δ4 -0.00043
δ4 0.00019 θ4 0.000000
δ3 -0.00015 θ3 -0.000004
δ2 0.00004 θ2 -0.000003
δ1 0.00004 θ1 -0.000006
δ0 0.00159 θ0 -0.000008
δ
1 0.00003 θ1 0.000004
δ
2 0.00005 θ2 0.000001
δ
3 -0.00017 θ3 0.000002
δ
4 0.00018 θ4 0.000002
γ1 -0.11455 γ1 -0.11459
γ2 -0.01676 γ2 -0.01684
R¯2 0.015 R¯2 0.015
Q5 3016 Q5 298
Notes: regression coefficients are estimated using the OLS method with Newey-West standard errors and 2
lags in the dependent variable. It is signed intervention (+1 for dollar purchases, -1 for dollar sales), Xt is
signed intervention magnitude (in millions of US dollars) and r t is the percentage return on the USD/CHF.
A  () indicates that the given statistic is significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level. Q5 is the
fifth order Box-Ljung statistic for serial correlation. The coefficient values which are not reported for reason
of space are not significant.
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Table 4: Effects of prior exchange rate trend on intervention effect
24 hour trend 6 hour trend
Regressor With Against With Against
α 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
β8 -0.0131 -0.0109 -0.0029 -0.0290
β7 0.0139 0.0107 0.0154 0.0009
β6 0.0301 -0.0065 0.0172 -0.0086
β5 -0.0145 -0.0253 -0.0068 -0.0432
β4 0.0374 -0.0293 0.0064 -0.0196
β3 0.0646 0.0005 0.0460 -0.0071
β2 0.01 0.0043 0.0183 -0.0074
β1 0.0661 0.0333 0.0738 0.0030
β0 0.1866 0.0820 0.17836 0.0276
β
1 -0.0350 -0.0325 -0.0298 -0.0376
β
2 0.0026 -0.013 -0.0077 -0.0068
β
3 -0.0278 -0.0091 -0.0152 -0.0225
β
4 -0.023 -0.0113 -0.0225 -0.0067
β
5 0.007 0.0178 0.0014 0.0285
β
6 -0.0023 -0.0014 -0.0082 0.0031
β
7 -0.00237 0.0048 -0.0123 -0.0017
β
8 -0.0153 -0.007 -0.0117 -0.0096
γ1 -0.1147 -0.1142 -0.1150 -0.1141
γ2 -0.0170 -0.0165 -0.0170 -0.0166
Num. of Obs. 72 105 112 65
R¯2 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.013
Q5 27.90 29.33 28.76 27.87
Notes: the table presents results from estimations of the with/against the trend regressions and the
concerted/non-concerted specifications. Coefficients are estimated using the OLS method with Newey-West
standard errors and 2 lags in the dependent variable. I t is signed intervention (+1 for dollar purchases, -1
for dollar sales) and rt is the percentage return on the USD/CHF. A  () indicates that the given statistic is
significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level. Q5 is the fifth order Box-Ljung statistic for serial
correlation.
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Table 5: Concerted intervention regressions
Equation (5) Equation (6)
Regr. Coeff. Regr. Coeff. Regr. Coeff. Regr. Coeff.
α0 0.0000 κ1 0.1153 α0 0.0000 κ1 0.1267
β8 -0.0056 κ0 0.1230 β8 -0.0057 κ0 0.1120
β7 -0.0101 κ1 -0.0685 β7 -0.0101 κ1 -0.0652
β6 0.0054 β6 0.0053 δ0 0.0012
β5 -0.0437 β5 -0.0437 λ0 0.0007
β4 0.0011 γ1 -0.1416 β4 0.0011 γ1 -0.1416
β3 0.0575 γ2 -0.0220 β3 0.0591 γ2 -0.0221
β2 0.0238 β2 0.0215
β1 0.0485 β1 0.0425
β0 0.1576 β0 0.0996
β
1 -0.0089 β1 -0.0214
β
2 -0.0063 β2 -0.0083
β
3 -0.0199 β3 -0.0175
β
4 0.0243 β4 0.0246
β
5 0.0040 β5 0.0038
β
6 -0.0144 β6 -0.0145
β
7 0.0096 β7 0.0097
β
8 -0.0034 β8 -0.0034
R¯2 0.014 R¯2 0.0218
Q5 30.60 Q5 29.84
Notes: regression coefficients are estimated using the OLS method with Newey-West standard errors. I t is
signed intervention (+1 for dollar purchases, -1 for dollar sales), Xt is signed intervention quantity (positive
for dollar purchases, negative for dollar sales), Ct is a concerted intervention indicator, which is unity for
intervals in which the SNB intervened and the Fed and Buba were both reported to be in the market up to 1
hour beforehand or 45 minutes afterwards. A  () indicates that the given statistic is significantly different
from zero at the 5% (1%) level. Q5 is the fifth order Box-Ljung statistic for serial correlation.
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Table 6: Regression of returns on separate signed SNB, Fed and Buba intervention indica-
tors
Regressor Coefficient Regressor Coefficient
α -0.0002 φ4 0.0153
β8 -0.0057 φ3 0.0617
β7 -0.0084 φ2 -0.0003
β6 0.0071 φ1 -0.0142
β5 -0.0442 φ0 -0.0112
β4 -0.0015 φ1 -0.0082
β3 0.0474 φ2 -0.0224
β2 0.0210 φ3 -0.0220
β1 0.0674 φ4 0.0013
β0 0.1670 ψ4 -0.0008
β
1 -0.0491 ψ3 0.0511
β
2 -0.0056 ψ2 0.0659
β
3 -0.0165 ψ1 0.0039
β
4 0.0184 ψ0 -0.0128
β
5 0.0045 ψ1 -0.0183
β
6 -0.0016 ψ2 0.0109
β
7 0.0193 ψ3 0.0014
β
8 0.0025 ψ4 -0.0396
γ1 -0.1308 γ2 -0.0219
R¯2 0.020 Q5 43.51
Notes: Regression coefficients are estimated using the OLS method with Newey-West standard errors. I t is
signed intervention (+1 for dollar purchases, -1 for dollar sales), I Ft is a signed indicator of Reuters reports of
Fed intervention and IBt is a signed indicator of Reuters reports of Buba intervention. A
 () indicates that
the given statistic is significantly different from zero at the 5% (1%) level. Q5 is the fifth order Box-Ljung
statistic for serial correlation.
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Figure 1: Basic effects of intervention and customer trades on the USD/CHF
(a) Intervention (b) Customer trades
Notes: Basic effects of intervention and customer trades on the USD/CHF. Results are based on exchange rates and intervention events
defined using a 15 minutes sampling frequency. Time is measured in 15 minute intervals relative to intervention. The dashed lines
indicate the 95% confidence interval for the cumulative intervention effect.
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Figure 2: Size effects of intervention on the USD/CHF
(a) Impulse-response function (b) Non-linearities in immediate impact
Notes: Results are based on exchange rates and intervention events defined using a 15 minutes sampling frequency. The x-axis for panel
(a) gives the (15 minute) interval relative to the intervention. In panel (a), the three selected values for the intervention size correspond
to the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile of the distribution of intervention size. Panel (b) shows the relationship between
intervention size and the change in the exchange rate. The dashed line is the exchange rate impact implied by considering the estimated
linear terms in equation (4) only while the solid line is the impact generated by considering the estimated linear and quadratic terms
from equation (4).
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Figure 3: Effects of trend on intervention impact (24 hour trend definition)
(a) With trend (b) Against trend
Notes: Results are based on exchange rates and intervention events defined using a 15 minutes sampling frequency. An intervention
event is defined to be with the trend if its sign is the same as that of the change in the rate of the prior 24 hours. Time is measured in
15 minute intervals relative to the intervention. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval for the cumulative intervention
effect.
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